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I. INTRODUCTION 
Settlors create trusts every day. They establish trusts believing the 
provisions in the trust agreement will carry out their intent. If the settlor 
included an arbitration provision, will arbitration actually occur? Can 
you really trust your trust? 
Trusts play an important role in estate planning and the transfer of 
wealth in the United States. They enable settlors to pass the benefits of 
ownership to beneficiaries without requiring those beneficiaries to 
accept the burdens of ownership. As trusts gained popularity over the 
last one hundred years, a unique weakness became apparent. Trust assets 
are susceptible to depletion when disputes arise between parties to the 
trust. 
Arbitration is a powerful tool available to settlors in the fight to 
protect trust assets from depletion by lengthy litigation. However, courts 
have been reluctant to enforce arbitration provisions in trust agreements. 
In May 2013, Texas became the first jurisdiction to enforce an 
arbitration agreement in a trust instrument.1 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part Two provides insight on the 
history and development of trust law as well as the interest in arbitration 
to settle trust disputes. Part Three explains the factual background, 
holding, and rationale of the Supreme Court of Texas in Rachal v. Reitz.2 
Part Four analyzes the Court’s decision and its implications. This part 
also asserts that the Court ruled correctly by giving effect to the intent of 
the settlor, including the arbitration agreement in the Texas Arbitration 
Act, and laying the groundwork for arbitration agreements to be 
enforced against trustees and beneficiaries on the basis of a direct 
benefits estoppel theory. 
II. BACKGROUND
Trust law originated under English law but has been subsequently 
developed in the English and American court systems.3 Development 
came primarily through court decisions that established basic common 
law principles.4 States gradually codified portions of the common law.5 
* Michael Tipton is a candidate for Juris Doctor at The University of Akron School of Law. He
received a B.A. from Ohio Christian University and an M.Div. from Wesley Biblical Seminary. 
1. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013).
2. Id.
3. WALTER L. NOSSAMAN & JOSEPH L. WYATT, JR., TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND 
TAXATION § 1.01(2) (2014). 
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2.
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In recent years, states have enacted more thorough laws in an attempt to 
establish a unified body of trust law.6 The Uniform Trust Code 2000 
seeks to provide guidance in areas where the law diverges or is yet to be 
defined.7 The Restatement of Trusts seeks to provide a codification of 
common law principles.8 Thus, the current development of trust law is 
seen in court decisions, statutory enactments, and uniform model codes. 
Traditional family trusts have three primary purposes: to manage 
property, conserve property, and protect beneficiaries.9 Trusts also 
provide tax advantages for families.10 One or more of these purposes 
usually factor into the creation of a trust.11 These considerations reflect 
the importance and personal nature of trust agreements. Due to varying 
circumstances, numerous types of trusts emerged, each tailored to 
address the unique needs and distinct circumstances faced by settlors and 
their intended beneficiaries.12 
Despite the development of a variety of trusts, trusts have a unique 
vulnerability. Trust assets are susceptible to partial or complete depletion 
by litigation. Disputes consist primarily of contests to validity and 
interpretation or application of the trust’s terms.13 In either form of trust 
dispute litigation, the trustee’s legal fees are paid by the trust.14 The 
problem is exacerbated because the attorney for the plaintiff beneficiary 
is often paid on a contingency basis.15 Thus, the plaintiff has much to 
gain and little or no risk in initiating litigation.16 Whether the trustee 
wins or loses, the trust will pay legal fees.17 
Arbitration provides an effective alternative to resolve disputes 
rather than lengthy litigation. It provides an objective standard of 
fairness to disputes.18 Simultaneously, it provides a solution to the 
problem of depletion by litigation and avoids extended court battles.19 
6. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 389 (9th ed.
2013). 
7. NOSSAMAN & WYATT, supra note 3, § 1.02(2), at 3.
8. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 390.
9. NOSSAMAN & WYATT, supra note 3, § 1.02.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Steven Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique,
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 629 (2011). 
14. Id. at 630.
15. Id. at 629.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills & Trusts: Defining the Parameters for
Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L.J. 118, 119 (2011). 
19. Murphy, supra note 13, at 635-36.
3
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Procedure, discovery, and other aspects of a normal trust dispute are 
streamlined.20 This decreases the time spent resolving disputes and 
minimizes the impact on the trust’s assets.21 Furthermore, arbitration is a 
private matter.22 The settlor and beneficiaries are protected from 
potential embarrassment because, unlike wills, arbitration records are not 
public.23 
Arbitration also provides flexibility in fashioning a remedy.24 A 
settlor can craft an arbitration clause to meet his specific needs and 
address his specific circumstances. Settlors can specify how arbitrators 
are chosen and what types of disputes will be submitted to arbitration.25 
Settlors may choose to make the arbitration broad or narrow. A settlor 
may even tailor the arbitration clause to a small number of specific 
situations known to arise often.26 
Arbitration provides another distinct advantage for settlors with 
complex or unique assets. In this situation, a settlor may desire to 
appoint co-trustees, each with specialized knowledge.27 Each trustee 
would oversee the part of the trust that corresponds to his unique 
expertise. However, the potential for dispute in this case could be high. 
To offset this risk, a settlor could craft an arbitration provision to address 
this particular conflict. In so doing, they would be able to rely on expert 
management, avoid costly disputes in court, and avoid affecting the 
rights of the beneficiaries. These examples are illustrative of the reasons 
why arbitration has gained popularity in recent years. 
A number of states have enacted or revised trust laws in recent 
years.28 The trend favors the settlor.29 These jurisdictions seek to 
emphasize, as a matter of policy, the intent of the settlor.30 For instance, 
some jurisdictions have limited or abolished the Rule Against 
20. Katzen, supra note 18, at 119.
21. Murphy, supra note 13, at 635.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Katzen, supra note 18, at 119.
25. Murphy, supra note 13, at 636.
26. Id. at 637. Murphy highlights one such often reoccurring dispute in the trust context. An
arbitration clause could be drafted to cover disputes between a lifetime beneficiary and a trustee that 
addresses disbursements made to the lifetime beneficiary. Trustees often favor remaindermen over 
lifetime beneficiaries. This inclination towards favoring remaindermen could be driven by a desire 
to avoid personal liability or keep trust assets as high as possible. The greater the trust fund, the 
more the trustee will collect in fees. Lifetime beneficiaries often have no recourse but to litigate 
every time they want to challenge a denial and compel a disbursement. 
27. Id.
28. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 389.
29. Murphy, supra note 13, at 633.
30. Id.
4
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Perpetuities.31 This allows a settlor to have significant dead-hand 
control. Another change is the approval of arbitration in trust disputes. 
Arizona, Michigan, and California superseded case law with statutes that 
enforce arbitration clauses in trust agreements.32 
Opponents of arbitration counter with concerns about the rights of 
beneficiaries to access the court system and to challenge the validity of 
the trust itself. They also point out an ulterior motive for the adoption of 
settlor-friendly laws: the development or protection of the state’s 
economic interest.33 Some states have benefitted greatly from settlor-
friendly laws, which resulted in the migration of trust assets to those 
states.34 In response, other states have adopted settlor-friendly laws to 
keep trust assets from leaving their state. Thus, opponents argue that the 
primary interest in these laws is economic rather than driven by a desire 
to honor the settlor’s intent. 
The focus on settlor’s intent, the competition for trust assets, and 
the increasing popularity of arbitration has resulted in increased use of 
arbitration clauses in trust agreements. However, the enforceability of 
these provisions remains a question of debate. The primary question is 
whether an arbitration agreement can be enforced against beneficiaries 
and trustees who themselves did not sign an agreement to arbitrate.35 
In 2013, Texas became the fourth jurisdiction to address the issue 
directly and the first jurisdiction to conclude that mandatory arbitration 
agreements in valid trusts are enforceable against beneficiaries.36 The 
facts and reasoning of that case are set out below. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts 
Andrew Francis Reitz established the A.F. Reitz Trust in 2000.37 He 
named himself as the trustee and his sons, James and John, as sole 
beneficiaries.38 The trust was revocable during his lifetime and 
31. Id.
32. Nancy E. Delaney, Jonathan Byer, & Michael S. Schwartz, Rachal v. Reitz and the
Evolution of the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 27 PROB. & 
PROP. 12, 15-16 (2013). 
33. Murphy, supra note 13, at 633.
34. Id.
35. Katzen, supra note 18, at 122.
36. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850-51 (Tex. 2013).
37. Id. at 842.
38. Id.
5
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irrevocable after his death.39 The successor trustee was Hal Rachal, Jr., 
the attorney who drafted the trust.40 
The trust contained a provision requiring all disputes to go to 
arbitration.41 The arbitration provision stated: 
Arbitration. Despite anything herein to the contrary, I intend that as to 
any dispute of any kind involving this Trust or any of the parties or 
persons concerned herewith (e.g. beneficiaries, Trustees), arbitration as 
provided herein shall be the sole and exclusive remedy, and no legal 
proceedings shall be allowed or given effect except as they may relate 
to enforcing or implementing such arbitration in accordance herewith. 
Judgment on any arbitration award pursuant hereto shall be binding 
and enforceable on all said parties.42 
The trust further stated that the agreement was binding on “the Grantor, 
Trustees, and beneficiaries hereto and on their respective heirs, 
executors, administrators, legal representatives, and successors.”43 
In 2009, John Reitz sued Rachal individually and as the trustee.44 
Reitz alleged that Rachal failed to provide an accounting to the 
beneficiaries as required by law and that he breached his fiduciary duty 
by failing to account and “by concealing his systematic looting of the 
trust for his personal gain.”45 Reitz requested three forms of relief: a 
temporary injunction, Rachal’s removal as trustee, and damages.46 
Rachal denied the allegation and moved to compel arbitration under the 
Texas Arbitration Act.47 
B. Procedural History 
The trial court denied Rachal’s motion to compel arbitration, and 
Rachal filed an interlocutory appeal.48 A divided Court of Appeals, 
sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court’s decision.49 The court held that 
an arbitration provision is only binding if it is the product of an 
enforceable contract between the parties.50 They reasoned that a trust 
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 843.
44. Id. at 842.
45. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. App. 2011).
46. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 842. 
47. Id.
48. Id. at 843.
49. Id.
50. Id.
6
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does not constitute a qualifying contract under those terms because there 
is no consideration, and the beneficiaries did not consent to the 
arbitration provision.51 The Supreme Court of Texas granted the 
trustee’s petition to decide whether an arbitration provision under the 
Texas Arbitration Act in an inter vivos trust is enforceable against trust 
beneficiaries.52 
C. The Court’s Ruling and Rational 
The Supreme Court of Texas ruled in favor of the trustee, Rachal.53 
The Court held that the Texas Arbitration Act does not require a formal 
contract but only an agreement to arbitrate future conflicts.54 Based on 
the settlor’s intent,55 the language of the Texas Arbitration Act,56 and the 
theory of direct benefits estoppel,57 the trust constituted an agreement 
within the statute. It further held that the dispute was within the scope of 
the arbitration provision.58 Therefore, the arbitration agreement was 
enforceable against Reitz as a beneficiary of the trust. 
Texas seeks to enforce trusts according to the settlor’s intent.59 The 
intent of the settlor is determined by the “four corners” of an 
unambiguous trust.60 Furthermore, trusts are enforced over the 
objections of the beneficiaries.61 In this case, the settlor expressly stated 
that all disputes should be arbitrated.62 Where unambiguous language 
shows a settlor’s intent that disputes be arbitrated, arbitration must be 
compelled if the trust is valid and the dispute is within the arbitration 
provision’s scope.63 
Reitz claimed that the arbitration clause was not enforceable 
because the trust was not a contract. The Court noted that the Texas 
Arbitration Act (or “Act”) countenances both contracts and 
agreements.64 Because “agreement” was not defined in the Act, the plain 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 842.
54. Id. at 844.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 848.
57. Id. at 847.
58. Id. at 850.
59. Id. at 844.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex.
1977)). 
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 844-45.
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meaning of the term and legislative intent were given effect.65 The plain 
meaning of “agreement” is broader than its meaning in contracts.66 
Contracts require consideration and mutual assent. An agreement only 
requires mutual assent, not consideration.67 Furthermore, had the 
legislature intended the Act to apply only to formal contracts, they 
would have made it clear.68 Thus, both the plain meaning and legislative 
intent support using the broad definition of “agreement.” 
Under this broad definition, the Court found that the beneficiary, 
John Reitz, assented to the terms of the agreement.69 While a party 
typically manifests assent by signing an agreement, non-signatories to 
arbitration provisions may assent under the theory of direct benefits 
estoppel.70 Direct benefits estoppel recognizes assent where a party to 
the agreement seeks substantial benefits from the agreement. In this 
case, Reitz sought benefits in two ways. First, he accepted the benefits of 
the trust.71 Second, he sued to enforce the terms of the agreement.72 A 
litigant “who attempts to enforce rights that would not exist without the 
trust manifests assent to the trust’s arbitration clause.”73 
A valid arbitration clause creates a presumption favoring 
arbitration.74 The Court looked to the facts, not the legal claim by 
Reitz.75 Because the arbitration clause included “any dispute of any kind 
involving the Trust or any of the parties or persons connected 
[t]herewith,” Reitz’s claim fell within the provision.76 Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order consistent with the 
opinion.77 
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Texas took a significant step by enforcing 
the arbitration agreement of the A.F. Reitz Trust against the beneficiary. 
65. Id.
66. Id. at 845.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 847.
70. Id. at 845-46.
71. Id. at 847.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 850.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 851.
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This step lays the groundwork and identifies a scheme by which Texas 
and other states could enforce arbitration provisions in trusts against 
beneficiaries and trustees. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Texas 
correctly honored the intent of the settlor, gave effect to the intent of the 
legislature to include agreements in the Texas Arbitration Act, and 
applied the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel in the trust context. 
A. The Supreme Court of Texas Ruled Correctly by Giving Effect to 
the Settlor’s Intent 
Giving effect to the intent of the settlor is a foundational principle 
of trust and estate law. A trust is created by a settlor for the benefit of a 
beneficiary.78 To be valid, the trust must reflect the settlor’s intent.79 The 
substance of a trust “does not depend on the substance of any party other 
than the donor herself.”80 
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) is illustrative of the goal to give 
effect to the intent of the settlor. The UTC offers a solution to the 
contemporary need for flexibility but does so “consistent with the 
principle that preserving the settlor’s intent is paramount.”81 The UTC 
defends the settlor’s intent by allowing modification or termination to 
further the purposes of the trust.82 While the UTC expands the equitable 
deviation doctrine to apply to dispositive and administrative provisions, 
it respects the settlor’s intent by requiring court action.83 Beneficiaries 
may not effect a termination or modification based on unanticipated 
circumstances alone. Changes under the equitable deviation doctrine 
must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention.84 If a 
change is made for tax purposes, it must not be contrary to the settlor’s 
probable intent.85 The UTC goes against the common law presumption 
that a trust is irrevocable unless expressly made revocable.86 Beyond 
reversal of the presumption, the UTC allows a settlor to revoke or amend 
a trust unless the terms of the trust expressly provide otherwise.87 The 
purpose is to give the fullest expression possible, under the 
78. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1647-48 (9th ed. 2009).
79. Id. at 1647.
80. Katzen, supra note 18, at 121.
81. UNIF. TRUST CODE, art. 4 cmt. (2000) (amended 2013). 
82. Alan Newman, Elder Law: The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code:
Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 664 (2005). 
83. Id. at 664-65.
84. Id. at 665.
85. Id. at 667.
86. Id. at 700.
87. Id. at 701.
9
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circumstances, to the intent of the settlor.88 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also emphasizes the goal of 
giving effect to the intent of the settlor. The Foreword to the 
Restatement (Third) notes that one of its two main principles is to make 
it easier to accomplish the settlor’s intent.89 This main principle is only 
limited by the requirements that the intention of the settlor can be 
reliably ascertained and that the settlor’s intentions are not contrary to 
public policy.90 This principle grants wide latitude to the donor in 
determining the future use of her transferred property. The second 
principle recognizes authority by which a settlor’s express intentions 
may be modified to contemporary circumstances.91 Even in this context, 
the settlor’s intention remains an important factor. 
The Restatement of Wills and Other Donative Transfers echoes this 
sentiment, stating that the donor’s intent is the controlling consideration 
in the interpretation of a donative document.92 As a central element, the 
settlor’s intent provides a strong foundation for the application of a 
mandatory arbitration clause against beneficiaries and trustees. It is 
consistent with both the historical foundations of trust law and current 
authorities. 
The influence of the settlor’s intent is not unlimited. A settlor’s 
intent cannot justify breaking the law, unreasonably restrict the 
beneficiary’s right to marry, or disrupt a family.93 Furthermore, the 
settlor’s intent cannot automatically defeat elective share statutes.94 
However, these are exceptions to the general rule. Conversely, other 
rules that override express language of a donative document actually 
seek to give effect to the intent of the settlor or testator.95 For instance, 
laws that enforce gifts to omitted spouses and children seek to give 
effect to a testator’s perceived intent.96 These situations may arise when 
a testator executes a donative document and subsequently marries or has 
a child.97 Omitted spouse and child statutes presume that the testator 
would have changed the donative document, had it been thought of.98 In 
88. UNIF. TRUST CODE, art. 4 cmt. (2000) (amended 2013). 
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS foreword (2003).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 653 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §4
(2003)). 
93. Id. at 653.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 654.
96. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-301, 2-302 (amended 2010).
97. Murphy, supra note 13, at 654.
98. Id.
10
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these cases, the express language does not control unless the testator 
expressly indicated intent to leave nothing to the spouse or child.99 
Collectively, limitations on settlor’s intent are exceptions to the general 
rule that settlor’s intent controls. 
Texas courts highly regard a settlor’s intent. In Huffman v. 
Huffman, the Supreme Court of Texas stated, “[a]ssuming that there is a 
valid will to be construed, it is the place of the court to find the meaning 
of such will, and not under the guise of construction or under general 
powers of equity to assume to correct or redraft the will in which the 
testator has expressed his intentions.”100 The Court supported this 
position in the context of trusts in Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. 
Newton,101 where it enforced the settlor’s intent over the objections of 
beneficiaries that disagreed with a trust’s terms.102 
Thus, based on the underlying policy and the precedent of the 
Supreme Court of Texas, the Court’s test for whether the arbitration 
provision should be enforced is appropriate. The test states that if the 
language of the arbitration provision is clearly expressed, valid, and the 
underlying dispute is within the provision’s scope, then arbitration 
should be compelled.103 
Some proponents of arbitration argue, in the context of a will, that 
the testator’s intent should be sufficient to compel arbitration in will 
challenges based upon the relative rights of the testator and devisee.104 
The testator’s right to dispose of her property is superior to the right of 
an intestate heir or beneficiary under a prior will to receive the testator’s 
property at her death.105 The rights of an heir or devisee are inferior to 
and derivative of the rights of the testator.106 This is evidenced by the 
rights of the testator to defeat the expectations of heirs apparent and 
devisees by transferring property through an inter vivos transfer to a 
different party.107 Statutory intestacy schemes further support the 
position. Intestacy statutes are principally concerned with giving effect 
to the probable intent of the decedent “rather than protecting any right 
99. Id. at 654-55.
100.  Huffman v. Huffman, 339 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. 1960). 
101.  Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977). 
102.  Id. at 153. 
103.  Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex. 2013). 
104.  E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from 
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 275, 
299 (1999). 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 300. 
107.  Id. at 299. 
11
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that inheres in the status of an heir.”108 The rights of a beneficiary only 
exist because the testator granted those rights.109 
By analogy, this logic is applicable in the context of a trust. While 
there are distinctions between wills and trusts, the policy goal of treating 
probate and non-probate assets in a similar fashion should be given 
effect. The rights of a trust beneficiary derive from the voluntary act of a 
settlor in creating a trust. As in the context of a will, the settlor should be 
able to direct and condition the terms upon which their property is 
passed. At its heart, the distribution of benefits derived from property to 
a third party is a gift. 
In this case, Andrew Reitz created an express requirement in the 
trust agreement that “despite anything to the contrary, arbitration would 
be the sole and exclusive remedy for any dispute of any kind involving 
this Trust or any of the parties or persons connected [t]herewith.”110 The 
language is unequivocal and unambiguous. It is clear that the settlor did 
not want disputes over the A.F. Reitz Trust settled in court. 
The Texas Supreme Court also withstood the pressure to acquiesce 
to the desires of the beneficiary. This reflects the position of the Court in 
Newton. Focusing on the settlor’s intent, rather than the desires of the 
contesting beneficiary, solves an additional challenge in trust litigation: 
juries are prone to side with the contesting beneficiary.111 
The Supreme Court of Texas correctly found in favor of the trust, 
giving effect to the wishes of the settlor and defending his right to 
distribute his property on his own terms. In so doing, the justices acted 
in accordance with precedent. Furthermore, the Court reflected the 
prevailing view of the Uniform Trust Code, the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts, and the Restatement of Wills and Other Donative Transfers. The 
Court struck an effective balance of competing policy interests. 
B. The Supreme Court of Texas Ruled Correctly by Giving Effect to 
the Inclusion of Agreements in the Texas Arbitration Act 
The Supreme Court of Texas ruled correctly by giving effect to the 
inclusion of agreements in the Texas Arbitration Act. It honored the 
intent of the legislature and correctly applied Texas precedent. Rather 
than relying on the rationales of other jurisdictions, the Court provided 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. at 300. 
110.  Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013). 
111.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 629 (citing John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The 
Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 64-66 (1978)). 
12
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an analysis that unified theory, precedent, and state law. 
1. Four Foundational Theories of Trust Law
Four foundational theories underlie trust law. The most prominent 
theory is the donative theory.112 This theory focuses on the unilateral 
transfer of assets to a trustee.113 It is the underlying theory of the 
Restatement of Trusts position, which defines a trust as a beneficial 
conveyance of trust property.114 The Reporter of the Restatement of 
Trusts, Austin W. Scott, brought the donative theory to the forefront of 
American jurisprudence in the 20th century.115 His influence and 
promotion of the donative theory of trusts won out over previously 
accepted contractual understandings of trusts with respect to 
arbitration.116 
The second foundational theory of trust law is the contract 
theory.117 The contract theory focuses on the contract-like agreement 
between the settlor and the trustee.118 There is an underlying agreement 
between the settlor and the trustee regarding the manner in which the 
trust assets will be managed.119 As Professor John Langbein asserts, the 
basic elements of a contract and a trust are the same – consensual 
formation and party autonomy.120 
While the donative theory and contract theory are the most common 
and frequently relied upon, the intent theory and benefit theory are also 
significant. Under the intent theory, the intent of the settlor serves as the 
foundation of trust law.121 Proponents of this position focus on the 
fundamental values of trust and estate law and focus on the donor’s 
rights.122 Enforcement of trust provisions, including arbitration clauses, 
is justified by relying on a clear manifestation of a settlor’s intent.123 
 112.  S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND.J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1174 (2012). 
113.  Id. 
114.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959). 
115.  Rachel M. Hirshberg, You Can’t Have Your Trust and Defeat It Too: Why Mandatory 
Arbitration Provisions in Trusts Enforceable, and Why State Courts Are Getting It Wrong, 2013 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 213, 216 (2013). 
116.  Strong, supra note 112, at 1175. 
117.  Id. at 1177. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. The contractual nature of a trust is most apparent in commercial trusts where an 
investor buys property for his own benefit under the management of the trustee. 
120.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 647. 
121.  Strong, supra note 112, at 1179-80. 
122.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 652. 
123.  Id. at 653. 
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Because intent is central to the interpretation of both wills and trusts, 
intent theory could be used to justify the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses in both wills and trusts.124 Furthermore, the intent theory 
provides a suitable foundation for the enforcement of an arbitration 
clause against fiduciaries and beneficiaries.125 
The benefit theory espouses the view that the beneficiary, who 
accepts a benefit from a trust, must also take the conditions and 
restrictions stipulated by the settlor.126 The acceptance of benefits is an 
implied agreement to be bound by the terms of the trust.127 The implied 
agreement is the basis for the agreement required by a state’s arbitration 
statute.128 This theory rests on a foundation of equity. Beneficiaries are 
estopped from accepting benefits without accepting responsibilities.129 
Some commentators believe that the benefit theory is well-suited to the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses because estoppel theories have been 
utilized in arbitration law as well.130 
2. The Link Between Trust Law and Contract Law
The courts who have ruled on the enforcement of arbitration 
provisions cited the differences between trusts and contracts as the 
foundation for repudiating the enforceability of arbitration provisions in 
trust agreements.131 However, trusts and contracts have significant 
similarities that support a contractual theory of trust law. Similar to 
contracts, a trust is based on a written instrument.132 A settlor declares 
that he will transfer property to a trustee if the trustee will manage and 
use the property and its proceeds in a manner designated by the settlor 
for the benefit of the beneficiary.133 For a trust to exist there must be an 
offer by the settlor and acceptance by the trustee.134 
Beneficiaries also establish a contract-like relationship with a 
settlor. Receipt of a gift is consensual because beneficiaries have the 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Strong, supra note 112, at 1181. 
127.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 648-49.  
128.  Id. 
129.  Strong, supra note 112, at 1181. 
130.  Id. 
131.  See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); In re Calomiris, 894 
A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006); Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 132.  David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1027, 1062 (2012). 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at 1063. 
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opportunity to opt out of a gift or challenge the validity of the trust 
instrument.135 Either of these actions would constitute actions that are 
inconsistent with mutual assent. Similar to contracts, consent to the 
terms can be fairly inferred where a party has an opportunity to opt out 
but does not.136 Parties, including trustees and beneficiaries, manifest 
“assent to the instrument by failing to denounce it, rather than by 
affirmatively selecting its provisions.”137 
Thus, where a trust instrument contains an arbitration clause, the 
parties are put to an election.138 They must decide whether to enter into 
the agreement or opt out. This is substantially similar to the decision 
about whether to enter into a contract. 
There are additional significant contractual aspects of trust law that 
are applied specifically by Texas courts, which help justify and support a 
contractarian view of trust law. First, courts use contract principles to 
ascertain a settlor’s intent.139 Trusts and contracts are both interpreted 
according to the “four corners approach.”140 Second, courts construe the 
terms of contracts according to their plain meaning.141 Similarly, terms 
in trust instruments are construed to give meaning to every provision so 
that no provision is rendered meaningless.142 
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the Texas Arbitration Act 
required a written agreement to arbitrate in a contract.143 However, this 
is an overly narrow interpretation. The validity of an arbitration 
agreement is measured under the principles of traditional contract law.144 
Therefore, it is commonly held that a valid arbitration agreement must 
satisfy the requirements of a contract or exist within a valid contract.145 
Although trusts are analyzed according to contract principles, trusts do 
not have to satisfy all the requirements of a contract to make a valid 
trust.146 Thus, a legal instrument can be analyzed with contract principles 
and declared valid without fulfilling all the requirements necessary to 
establish a contract.147 Contract principles merely establish a framework 
135.  Id. at 1064. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. at 1064. 
138.  Id. at 1065. 
139.  Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 216. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. (citing Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366-67 (Tex. App. 2007). 
143.  See Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W. 3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011). 
144.  Id. at 309. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 229. 
147.  Id. 
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for a court’s analysis of arbitration agreements, not a test for 
enforceability.148 By implication, this opens the door for an arbitration 
agreement, existing beyond the bounds of a formal contract, to be 
declared valid and enforceable.149 Thus, a valid arbitration agreement 
could exist in a trust if neither the trust nor the arbitration agreement 
violated contract principles.150 
In the context of a trust, certain concerns arise when contract 
theories are applied to trusts to enforce arbitration agreements. One 
prominent concern regards excising the court’s jurisdiction to an 
unacceptable extent.151 Concern regarding the excising of a court’s 
jurisdiction often lies in the desire to protect the balance of power 
between various parties to a trust.152 For example, this could occur by 
approving a method of dispute resolution that disadvantages one party or 
allows a trustee to overreach the requisite fiduciary duties.153 
This concern is overstated. Submitting a dispute to arbitration does 
not hinder the balance of power because the law requires that arbitration 
clauses be clear to be enforced.154 If the clause is clear, the intent of the 
settlor can be ascertained, along with the rights and obligations intended 
by the settlor.155 An arbiter could enforce the requisite rights and 
obligations of the parties and avoid disadvantaging one party. 
Arbitration also can prevent overreach by a trustee. Focusing on 
effective accountability, courts seek to enforce the irreducible core 
duties of a trustee.156 The arbiter could probe the actions of the trustee, 
require accountability, and enforce the terms of the trust.157 Effective 
accountability is not limited to the courts if arbitration is binding. 
3. Distinguishing Precedent Cases
Prior to Rachal, only three jurisdictions had ruled directly on the 
question of whether an arbitration provision in a trust agreement is 
enforceable. The first jurisdiction to address the question directly was 
Arizona in Schoneberger v. Oelze.158 In that case, a father and step-
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. at 230. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Strong, supra note 112, at 1196. 
152.  Id. at 1197. 
153.  Id. at 1197-98. 
154.  Id. at 1198. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. at 1199. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
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mother created three irrevocable inter vivos trusts.159 Each disputed trust 
contained an identical arbitration provision.160 The provision stated, 
“[a]ny dispute arising in connection with this Trust, including disputes 
between Trustee and any beneficiary or among Co-Trustees, shall be 
settled by . . . negotiation, mediation, and arbitration,” according to 
specified rules.161 The document specifying procedures for arbitration 
was signed by both settlors and one of the two trustees.162 
The daughters brought separate actions against their father, step-
mother, and the trustees of the trust to which they were beneficiaries,163 
alleging breach of trust, conversion, and fraudulent concealment.164 The 
defendants moved to compel arbitration under the arbitration 
provisions.165 The defendants argued that the arbitration provisions each 
constituted a contractual provision and fell within the language of 
Arizona’s arbitration statute, despite the fact that neither beneficiary 
signed the agreement in their respective trusts.166 Alternatively, the 
defendants contended that the beneficiaries were estopped from 
objecting because they were receiving benefits from the trust.167 
As a threshold matter, the defendants had to prove the existence of 
a contract between the parties. Specifically, they had “to prove the 
existence of a written contract to submit to arbitration,” before the third 
party beneficiary and equitable estoppel arguments could be made.168 
The court ruled that, as a matter of law, trusts are not contracts.169 The 
court reasoned that with a trust the beneficiary receives a beneficial 
interest in trust property, while a party to a contract gains a personal 
claim against the promisor.170 While a fiduciary duty exists in the 
context of a trust, no such duty arises from a contract.171 Furthermore, 
trusts do not “stem from the premise of mutual assent to an exchange of 
promises and [are] not properly characterized as contractual.”172 Finally, 
although a settlor has the right to define the terms of the trust, he cannot 
159.  Id. at 1079-80. 
160.  Id. at 1080. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. at 1082. 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. at 1083. 
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“unilaterally strip trust beneficiaries of their right to access the courts 
absent their agreement.”173 Thus, the Arizona court did not enforce the 
arbitration provisions.174 
The second jurisdiction to address the subject directly was the 
District of Columbia in In re Calomiris.175 In that case, a dispute arose 
between four trustees of the William Calomiris Marital Trust.176 The 
trust was created by a will that contained a provision requiring 
mandatory arbitration of any material difference of opinion.177 The four 
trustees were siblings.178 After a disagreement arose among the trustees, 
the appellant sought removal of the appellees as trustees.179 After the 
trial court denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
appellant sought to compel arbitration.180 In order to prevail 
procedurally, the appellant had to show that the arbitration provision 
arose from the context of a written contract.181 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals followed the reasoning 
of the Schoneberger decision. The court was influenced by the fact that 
the arbitration provision the appellant sought to enforce was found in a 
will, not a contract.182 Citing the Schoneberger decision, the court found 
that arbitration rests on an exchange of promises.183 In contrast, the 
foundation of a trust created by a will is the transfer of a beneficial 
interest in property to a trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary.184 
Therefore, the court held that the arbitration provision in the will was not 
contractual and, thus, not enforceable.185 
California was the third jurisdiction to rule on the issue in Diaz v. 
Bukey.186 In that case, a dispute arose between two sisters who were 
beneficiaries to a trust.187 While both were beneficiaries, only one sister 
was a trustee. The non-trustee beneficiary requested an accounting of the 
financial activities of the trust, and she was unsatisfied with the 
173.  Id. at 1083-84. 
174.  Id. at 1084. 
175.  In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006). 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. at 409. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 410. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. 
186.  Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
187.  Id. at 611. 
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accounting provided by the trustee.188 The non-trustee beneficiary filed a 
petition, alleging that the trustee breached her fiduciary duties, failed to 
distribute trust assets, and used assets of the trust for her personal 
benefit.189 She sought relief in the form of removal of the trustee, 
appointment of a successor trustee, an accounting of the trust assets, and 
reimbursement of any misused assets by the trustee.190 The trustee filed a 
petition to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
provision in the trust.191 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and denied 
the trustee’s petition to compel arbitration.192 The court found that the 
California Arbitration Act required the existence of a contract to compel 
arbitration.193 Furthermore, the policy in favor of arbitration cannot 
override the basic requirements of the statute.194 The court found that the 
basic requirements of a contract had not been met.195 Neither party gave 
their consent to be bound by the arbitration provision in the trust, nor did 
the parties exchange consideration to achieve the status of beneficiary.196 
Following the reasoning in Schoneberger, the court found the trusts were 
not contracts and the arbitration provision in the trust was not 
enforceable against a party who had not agreed to arbitrate a dispute.197 
The Arizona, District of Columbia, and California courts found that 
an arbitration agreement is only enforceable if it arises from a provision 
in a written contract. This conclusion flows from the language of 
governing statutes.198 The language of the Arizona statute, similar to the 
District of Columbia and California statutes in effect at the time of its 
ruling, states: 
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration 
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any contro-
versy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and ir-
revocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. at 612. 
193.  Id.  
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. at 613. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 614.  
198.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (West, Westlaw through legis. eff. Feb. 24, 2015); 
D.C. CODE § 16-4301 (Westlaw through Mar. 25, 2015), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280, et seq. 
(West, Westlaw through ch.2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
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revocation of any contract.199 
In contrast, the Texas statute states: 
A written agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable if the agree-
ment is to arbitrate a controversy that exists at the time of the agree-
ment; or arises between the parties after the date of the agreement. A 
party may revoke the agreement only on a ground that exists at law or 
in equity for the revocation of a contract.200 
The key distinction between the Texas statute and the statutes in 
Arizona, California, and the District of Columbia is the treatment of 
future disputes, specifically the determination of the validity of an 
agreement to arbitrate future disputes. This distinction is dispositive. The 
then-operative statutes in Arizona, California, and the District of 
Columbia countenance agreements to arbitrate future disputes only when 
they are included in a provision in a written contract. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court of Texas found that an agreement to arbitrate future 
disputes is not bound by limits of a written contract. 
The basis for the position taken by Arizona, California, and the 
District of Columbia is rooted in the precedential reliance on the 
Restatement of Trusts distinction between contracts and trusts. The 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied on the rationale of the 
Arizona court in Schoneberger, which in turn relied on the reasoning set 
forth in In re Naarden Trust.201 In that case, the court relied heavily on 
the Restatement view that a trust is not a contract.202 Austin W. Scott 
heavily influenced the Restatement view.203 Scott, writing in 1917, 
addressed the inability of contract law to enforce trust agreements.204 
With nearly one hundred years of development in trust law and practice, 
the distinctions between trusts and contracts are not as profound as they 
once were.205 Furthermore, one of Scott’s other primary concerns was 
 199.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501. The Arizona legislature took up the issue in 2008 and 
passed a new law that validated the enforceability of certain alternative dispute resolution measures 
in trusts. The new law provides: “A trust instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive, and 
reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons or among interest 
persons with regard to the administration or distribution of the trust.” Id. § 14-10205. 
 200.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called 
Sess. of the 83rd Legis.). 
201.  Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
202.  In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1086 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 
203.  Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A 
Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 361 (2007). 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. at 362. Bruyere and Marino highlight two examples. First, trust law originally made 
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that a contractarian approach would shift trust law decisions from the 
courts of equity to juries.206 Based on this foundation, arbitration of trust 
disputes is not necessarily inconsistent with Scott’s articulation of the 
donative theory. Submitting trust disputes to arbitration would keep 
them out of the hands of juries. 
As stated above, the Supreme Court of Texas found that an 
agreement to arbitrate future disputes is not bound by limits of a written 
contract. Instead, the court looked to the broader meaning of an 
“agreement.” Thus, the analysis of the Arizona, District of Columbia, 
and California courts are distinguishable. 
4. The Supreme Court of Texas Ruled Correctly that Agreements
to Arbitrate Are Valid and Enforceable under the Texas
Arbitration Act
The Supreme Court of Texas ruled correctly in finding that a trust 
falls within the Texas Arbitration Act. Arbitration finds its roots in 
economic efficiency. Contracting parties desire to negotiate the terms on 
which future disputes will be resolved.207 Thus, arbitration is a product 
of contract law.208 
The Texas courts grappled with whether trust agreements are 
sufficiently similar to contracts to apply contract theories. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas specified that formation of a valid 
contract required an offer, acceptance, a meeting of the minds, consent 
to the terms, execution and delivery of the contract with intent that it be 
binding, and consideration.209 Under this rubric, lack of mutual assent is 
fatal to an arbitration clause. Because there is no consideration or mutual 
assent between a trustee and beneficiary, arbitration agreements are not 
enforceable.210 Thus, trusts were not recognized as being sufficiently 
similar to contracts to apply contract theories. 
The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the Texas Arbitration Act to 
answer the question.211 The substance and form of a state’s arbitration 
law is essential to the analysis. There are two model codes upon which 
no provision to compensate trustees. Second, third-party beneficiary contracts were not recognized 
under English contract law at the time of Scott’s writing and were still controversial at the time of 
their adoption by the Restatement. Id. Today, the acceptance of trustee compensation and third-
party beneficiary contracts are uncontroverted. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 631. 
208.  Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W. 3d 305, 308 (Tex. App. 2011). 
209.  Id. at 309. 
210.  Id. at 310-11. 
211.  Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 844-49 (Tex. 2013). 
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forty-seven states and the District of Columbia build their respective 
arbitration laws.212 The first is the Federal Arbitration Act, upon which 
nine states build their arbitration statutes.213 Congress passed the Federal 
Arbitration Act in 1925, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
subsequently expanded the law’s reach.214 Together, this created a strong 
policy favoring arbitration at the federal level.215 The Federal Arbitration 
Act requires an arbitration clause to be a written provision in a 
contract.216 The Supreme Court supported the contractual nature of 
arbitration in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of 
America.217 The Supreme Court explained, “arbitration is a matter of 
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any 
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”218 However, the Supreme 
Court has not required an arbitration agreement to be found in a 
document that satisfies all the requirements of a contract.219 Arbitration 
agreements in “mere written agreements” and other non-contract 
documents have been found to be valid.220 
The second model code is the Uniform Arbitration Act, upon which 
thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia base their statutes. This 
act countenances agreements.221 It states that a mandatory arbitration 
agreement is enforceable if the agreement is in writing.222 The Uniform 
Arbitration Act authorizes enforcement of a broader set of agreements 
than simply contracts. While state arbitration laws differ, all states 
require a valid arbitration agreement to be in writing, based on mutual 
assent, and evidence intent to be bound.223 
Federal courts and state courts often come to different conclusions 
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements that are “extra-
contractual.” The U.S. Supreme Court looks to the Federal Arbitration 
Act as its guide.224 In contrast, state courts look to their own state’s 
212.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 640. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 217. 
215.  Id. 
216.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
217.  Hirshberg, supra note115, at 217 (citing AT&T Techs v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 
475 U.S 643, 648-49 (1986)). 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. at 218. 
220.  Id. 
221.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 640. 
222.  UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(a) (2000). 
223.  Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 218. 
224.  Id. at 219. 
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contract law.225 However, case law on the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in trust instruments is limited. The courts that have ruled on 
the issue often rely on the reasoning of other jurisdictions.226 
Because Arizona was the first jurisdiction to rule directly on the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements in trust instruments,227 its ruling 
in Schoneberger has been influential. Following the Arizona approach, 
the District of Columbia and California courts applied categorical 
arguments to find that trust agreements were not sufficiently similar to 
contracts to enable enforcement of arbitration clauses found in trusts. 
The Supreme Court of Texas also made a categorical argument but 
came to a different conclusion. The Texas Arbitration Act is based on 
the Uniform Arbitration Act. It states that a “written agreement to 
arbitrate is valid and enforceable if the agreement is to arbitrate a 
controversy that: (1) exists at the time of the agreement; or (2) arises 
between the parties after the date of the agreement.”228 The court 
focused on the term “agreement” and found that an agreement is simply 
a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more competent persons.229 
Under this broad definition, the court held that a settlor and a beneficiary 
to a trust can manifest mutual assent without the signatures of both 
parties. Therefore, a trust does fall within the definition of an agreement 
under the Texas Arbitration Act, and mandatory arbitration clauses in 
trust agreements can be enforced. This is a significant shift from the 
other jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue. 
5. Conclusion
The similarities between trusts and contracts are significant. Trusts 
are analyzed by contract principles. At the heart of a trust is an 
agreement, and the Texas Arbitration Act enforces agreements. This 
forms the basis for the enforcement of an arbitration provision found 
within a trust. While it is not conclusive, the broad interpretation of the 
definition of an agreement opens the door for enforcement of an 
arbitration provision based upon the theory of direct benefits estoppel. 
C. The Supreme Court of Texas Laid the Groundwork for Enforcing 
225.  Id. 
 226.  See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409-10 (D.C. 2006); Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
610, 614-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
227.  Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 220. 
228.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called 
Sess. of the 83rd Legis.). 
229.  Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 845 (2013). 
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Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Trust Agreements 
Courts have justified the enforcement of mandatory arbitration 
provisions in contracts because the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes.230 
The challenge in applying contract theories to trusts is that neither the 
beneficiary nor the trustee signed a contract with the settlor in which 
they agreed to the arbitration provision. However, arbitration statutes 
generally do not include a Statute of Frauds provision requiring parties 
to be signatories to the agreement.231 The basic requirement is simply 
that the agreement be in writing. Thus, courts may rely on other theories 
to bind non-signatories to arbitration provisions in trust agreements. 
1. Theories Binding Non-Signatories to Arbitration Provisions
Both federal and state courts recognize principles of contract law 
that can bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.232 Federal 
courts and various state courts have recognized six theories that may 
bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements: (1) incorporation by 
reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) third-party 
beneficiary; and (6) equitable estoppel.233 
These theories affirm the principle that a party who has not signed a 
contract may be required to submit to arbitration. Under the 
incorporation by reference theory, the non-signatory is bound by signing 
a separate agreement in which he expressly agreed to be bound by an 
arbitration agreement.234 The assumption theory is based upon the 
presupposition that the party succeeded to the obligation to arbitration.235 
Under the agency theory, the non-signatory is a vicarious party to the 
agreement.236 The alter ego theory espouses the position that the non-
signatory was a de facto signatory.237 The third party beneficiary theory 
is based upon the fact that the parties to the contract intended the non-
230.  Katzen, supra note 18, at 121. 
 231.  J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial III, Equitable Estoppel as a Basis for Compelling 
Nonsignatories to Arbitrate – A Bridge Too Far?, 21 REV. LIT. 593, 597 (2002). The authors note 
that the Federal Arbitration Act, which serves as a model for many state arbitration laws, simply 
requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing. 
232.  Christina Crozier, Estoppel Doctrine Allows Arbitration Provisions to Be Enforced By 
and Against Non-Signatories, 46 HOUSTON LAW. 12, 13 (2008). 
233.  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005). 
 234.  Dwayne E. Williams, Binding Nonsignatories To Arbitration Agreements, 25 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 175, 176 (2006). 
235.  Id. at 179. 
236.  Id. at 177. 
237.  Id. at 179. 
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signatory to benefit directly from the contract.238 
Apart from these five long-standing theories, equitable estoppel 
was recognized in the 1960s as a circumstance in which a contract could 
be implied.239 Equitable estoppel is “the doctrine by which a person may 
be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to 
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.”240 
Direct benefits estoppel is a particular iteration of the equitable estoppel 
doctrine. 
Direct benefits estoppel establishes the rule that a beneficiary who 
accepts benefits from a will or trust impliedly agrees to be bound by its 
terms.241 It may be applied to bind a non-signatory plaintiff to arbitrate 
where a signatory seeks to compel arbitration.242 There are two broad 
categories of situations that would give rise to the theory’s application: 
(1) when a non-signatory pursues an action based on the terms of a 
contract, and (2) when the non-signatory seeks and obtains benefits from 
the contract.243 When a non-signatory takes one or both of these actions, 
she has embraced the contract. The underlying theory is that a non-
signatory cannot defeat the contract in order to avoid its burdens while at 
the same time enforce the contract to gain its benefits. As summarized in 
In re Weekley Homes, a non-signatory cannot “have his contract and 
defeat it too.”244 
As applied in contract situations, parties may be bound when a non-
signatory party pursues a claim under the contract or when the non-
signatory seeks and obtains substantial benefits from the contract.245 
Merely being related to a contract is not sufficient grounds to bind a 
non-signatory to an arbitration clause.246 Arbitration should only be 
compelled when a non-signatory seeks to derive a direct benefit from a 
contract containing an arbitration provision.247 
At the federal level, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated 
limits to the doctrine in Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc. 
The court clarified that the non-signatory must knowingly seek a benefit 
238.  Id. at 178. 
239.  Uloth & Rial, supra note 231, at 604. 
240.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (6th ed. 1990). 
241.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 648-49. 
242.  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005). 
243.  See Crozier, supra note 232, at 13. 
244.  In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005). 
245.  Id. at 131-33. 
246.  Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 741. 
247.  Id. 
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or enforcement of provision in a contract.248 Without actual knowledge 
of the underlying contract, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the 
doctrine.249 
While appearing similar, direct benefits estoppel and the third party 
beneficiary theory are distinct. The foundation of direct benefits estoppel 
is reliance on or exploitation of the underlying contract.250 The third 
party beneficiary theory is based upon the intent of the signatories at the 
time the contract was signed.251 
2. Texas’s Adoption of Direct Benefits Estoppel Theory
Texas adopted the direct benefits estoppel theory in In re Kellogg 
Brown & Root, Inc.252 Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR) served as a 
sub-subcontractor supplying labor, equipment, and facilities for the 
construction of elevator trunks to be used on a cruise ship.253 After the 
cruise ship buyer declared bankruptcy, KBR asserted liens on the 
elevator trunks to protect its interests and sought to recover damages 
against the subcontractor and general contractor.254 The general 
contractor sought to compel KBR to arbitrate its claims based upon the 
arbitration agreement between the general contractor and the 
subcontractor.255 The Court determined that KBR was not required to 
arbitrate a claim against a contractor with whom they did not sign a 
contract.256 While the dispute was related to the claim, that was not 
sufficient to compel a non-signatory to arbitrate. The Court held that a 
non-signatory should be compelled to arbitrate a claim only if it seeks to 
derive a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration 
provision.257 
The court expanded the application of the rule in In re Weekley 
Homes.258 In that case, Weekley Homes signed a contract with a home 
248.  Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 249.  Id. at 475. Where there is not actual knowledge of an underlying contract, the basis of a 
plaintiff’s claim may be based on other representations made by the parties or general duties implied 
by law on the party or parties seeking to compel arbitration. Thus, when a party or court seeks to 
apply the theory of direct benefits estoppel, the party against whom the theory is applied may be 
able to assert lack of actual knowledge as an affirmative defense. 
250.  Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739. 
251.  Id. 
252.  In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005).  
253.  Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 735. 
254.  Id. at 735-36. 
255.  Id. at 735. 
256.  Id. at 741. 
257.  Id.  
258.  In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2005). 
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purchaser that contained an agreement to arbitrate “any claim, dispute, 
or cause of action between the Purchaser and Seller.”259 After 
construction defects became apparent, the purchaser, the purchaser’s 
trust, which held title to the home, and the purchaser’s daughter all 
brought actions against Weekley Homes.260 Responding to Weekley 
Homes’ motion to compel arbitration, the trial court granted the motion 
with respect to the purchaser and the purchaser’s trust.261 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether the 
purchaser’s daughter, who brought a claim in tort, should also be 
compelled to arbitrate.262 The Court stated that a “nonparty may be 
compelled to arbitrate if it deliberately seeks and obtains substantial 
benefits from the contract itself.”263 The Court focused its analysis on 
the non-signatory’s conduct during the performance of the contract.264 
The purchaser’s daughter had been substantially involved in the 
construction process and obtained reimbursement for expenses incurred 
during the repairs.265 The Court found that exercise of other contractual 
rights and “equitable entitlement of other contractual benefits 
prevent[ed] her from avoiding the arbitration clause.”266 
The Court was careful to note that recognition of the doctrine of 
direct benefits estoppel does not create liability.267 Furthermore, direct 
benefits estoppel does not apply when the benefits gained are 
insubstantial or indirect.268 However, where one party seeks and obtains 
substantial and direct benefits from a contract and the other party agrees, 
equity prevents avoidance of the arbitration clause in the underlying 
contract.269 
3. Application
The theory of direct benefits estoppel is the basis upon which the 
mutual assent needed to enforce an arbitration provision in a trust 
agreement can be found. Under this theory, the beneficiary who accepts 
259.  Id. at 129. 
260.  Id. 
261.  Id. at 130. 
262.  Id. at 129. 
263.  Id. at 132. 
264.  Id. at 132-33. 
265.  Id. at 133. 
266.  Id. at 135. 
267.  Id. at 134. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. at 134. 
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benefits from a will or trust impliedly agrees to be bound by its terms.270 
Additionally, the beneficiary is estopped from challenging the validity of 
a will or trust.271 Thus, the beneficiary would be barred from challenging 
an arbitration provision if they accepted benefits under the instrument. In 
the context of a trust, as in Rachal, the beneficiary manifests mutual 
assent by accepting the benefits of the trust.272 While a beneficiary may 
disclaim an interest,273 John Reitz failed to do so. He did not disclaim his 
interest or opt out of the provision by challenging the will prior to 
accepting the benefits.274 
The beneficiary also manifested mutual assent by seeking to 
enforce other terms of the trust.275 The trust contained a number of 
powers and restrictions on the trustee, including the prohibition from 
making “any distribution to or for the benefit of himself which is not 
subject to an ascertainable standard under the Code.”276 Reitz’s claims of 
material violations by the trustee, Rachal, and request for compensation 
were efforts to enforce the terms of the trust. In so doing, Reitz accepted 
the terms and affirmed the validity of the trust.277 Because he accepted a 
benefit from the trust, he also accepted the burden. 
The Supreme Court of Texas made an important clarification in its 
analysis. While direct benefits estoppel is generally applied in contract 
situations, an underlying contract is not required.278 The Court 
analogized to promissory estoppel in this regard.279 
Opponents have argued that direct benefits estoppel is not a 
workable solution because it only applies to the beneficiary.280 While 
this case only applied the theory to the beneficiary, the holding is not 
limited to the beneficiary. The Supreme Court of Texas asserted that the 
key is mutual assent, not the acceptance of benefits.281 A trustee 
voluntarily accepts the responsibility of being a trustee. Just as a 
beneficiary may reject the gift offered by a trust,282 a potential trustee 
270.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 648. 
271.  Id. at 648-49.  
272.  Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. 2013). 
273.  TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called Sess. of 
the 83rd Legis.). 
274.  Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 847. 
275.  Id. 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id. at 848. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 649. 
281.  Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 842. 
282.  TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.010 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 
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may reject the responsibility. The position is further justified if the 
trustee accepts compensation for being the trustee. 
Opponents also raise the problem of challenges to validity.283 In 
general, this is a problem for proponents of mandatory arbitration 
agreements. If the arbitration clause is mandatory, there would be no 
option to challenge the validity of a trust. Several states require 
challenges to validity to be heard by a court.284 However, Texas has 
already established by precedent that direct benefits estoppel does not 
apply to validity contests.285 A contest to the validity of a trust is conduct 
that is incompatible with the mutual assent.286 Under these terms, a 
beneficiary can challenge the validity of a trust, and the arbitration 
clause would not be binding. Texas found a way to solve the problem 
without swallowing the rule. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Texas identified mutual assent and direct 
benefits estoppel as theories upon which arbitration clauses may be 
enforced in trust agreements. If a state’s arbitration law recognizes 
agreements and a state’s constitution does not require trust disputes to be 
settled in court, the Texas approach justifies enforcement against both 
beneficiaries and trustees. In so doing, it gives effect to the intent of the 
settlor. This avoids the weaknesses found in applying the intent theory, 
contract theory, and benefit theory in isolation. Furthermore, it preserves 
the right of a potential beneficiary to contest the validity of the trust. 
The ruling enables settlors to act with confidence that the assets of 
their trust will not be depleted by lengthy litigation. Settlors will be able 
to take advantage of the flexibility provided by arbitration in dispute 
resolution. Additionally, it gives settlors confidence that potentially 
embarrassing disputes between parties to a trust will be settled in the 
more private context of arbitration. Texas has effectively addressed 
significant concerns of settlors and established a potential model for 
states similarly situated. Thus, for those in Texas and states that follow 
Texas’s lead, the answer is yes – you can trust your trust! 
83rd Legis.). 
283.  Murphy, supra note 13, at 643. 
 284.  New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan are representative of jurisdictions that require 
validity to be determined in court. 
285.  Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App. 2008). 
The Rapid Settlements court held that direct benefits estoppel is inapplicable when a nonsignatory 
filed suit for a declaration that an arbitration agreement was not binding on it. 
286.  Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 847 (citing Rapid Settlements, 251 S.W.3d at 148).  
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